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Subverting Workers’ Rights:  
Class Action Waivers and  
the Arbitral Threat to the NLRA 
Nicole Wredberg* 
The National Labor Relations Act (“NRLA”) was born out of the industrial strife of the 
Great Depression and provides for employee collective rights in order to prevent the 
potentially devastating economic consequences of an unstable working environment. The 
rights provided by the NLRA generally encompass the right to employee collective 
activity, including collective legal activity and unionizing, which seeks to better working 
conditions. These substantive rights cannot be waived through any employment 
agreement, but the Supreme Court has never decided the precise issue of whether 
pursuing a class action is a substantive right under the NLRA as a protected employee 
collective activity. The enforceability of class action waivers in employment arbitration 
agreements has become a hot topic over the past few years since the National Labor 
Relations Board (“Board”), which administers the NLRA, and the courts have largely 
split on whether the right to pursue a class action is a substantive right under the NLRA, 
as opposed to a mere procedural right that can be waived through agreement. This is an 
especially important issue to low-wage workers because if class action waivers are upheld 
in arbitration agreements, many low-wage workers, if not all, will be foreclosed from 
bringing claims regarding employer violations. This preclusion is primarily due to the fact 
that litigation costs often do not justify workers bringing these relatively low value claims 
on an individual basis. This Note examines how class actions comport with the 
substantive purpose of the NLRA and discusses the recent decisions of the Board and the 
courts regarding class action waivers in employment arbitration agreements. This Note 
will also offer a few potential resolutions. 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of California Hastings College of the Law; B.A. in English, 
2011, Sonoma State University. I would like to thank the staff of the Hastings Law Journal for all of 
their work on this Note. I would also like to thank my parents and my sisters, who have all been 
incredibly supportive of me over the years. This Note is dedicated to my former coworkers, many of 
whom I worked with for eight years or more. They have inspired me to support the employment rights 
of low-wage workers. 
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Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or 
“Act”) in 1935 as a means of alleviating the industrial strife of the Great 
Depression.1 Corporate monopolies and employer exploitation caused 
poor wages and working conditions, which eventually led to employee 
unrest.2 At a time when the country was experiencing economic instability 
and the worst outbreak of strikes in decades, Congress sought to address 
the industrial strife by leveling the playing field between employee and 
employer.3 Thus, the NLRA attempts to divert labor distress away from 
disruptive forms of employee activities, such as strikes, by giving 
employees more bargaining power through collective bargaining rights.4 
Accordingly, § 7 of the NLRA (“§ 7”) guarantees employees the right to 
“form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
 
 1. See Jonathan Fox Harris, Worker Unity and the Law: A Comparative Analysis of the National 
Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Hope for the NLRA’s Future, 13 N.Y.C. 
L. Rev. 107, 107 (2009). 
 2. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Economic Rationality and Union Avoidance: Misunderstanding the 
National Labor Relations Act, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 921 (1993). 
 3. See Laura J. Cooper, Letting the Puppets Speak: Employee Voice in the Legislative History of 
the Wagner Act, 94 Marq. L. Rev. 837, 841 (2011). 
 4. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2016). 
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protection” (“§ 7 rights”).5 The Act prohibits employers from interfering 
with an employee’s exercise of her § 7 rights.6 
Under § 7, the right to “form, join, or assist labor organizations” 
clearly protects union organizing and employee affiliation with unions.7 
Effectively, an employer cannot act in a way that would discourage 
employees from attempting to form a union, from participating in a union, 
or from associating with a union.8 Since the enactment of the NLRA, 
unions have been the primary means through which workers exercise 
their § 7 rights, and indeed the NLRA “envisions unions’ fundamental 
mission to be improving wages and other working conditions and standing 
with and supporting workers.”9 Unions are the most recognizable tool 
employees have to collectively advocate for fair working conditions, 
including wages, and union activity is explicitly protected by § 7.10 Without 
unions, employees lack a clear institution through which they can 
collectively bargain for fair working conditions.11 Thus, some scholars 
believe that the decline of unions and other labor organizations over the 
past few decades explains the increase in hourly wage inequality.12 
The decline in unions has led to a focus on the ambiguous meaning 
of the § 7 catchall“concerted activity for the purpose of . . . mutual aid 
or protection”13as workers are forced to find other protected § 7 means 
to address their workplace grievances. In response to the need to clarify 
the § 7 catchall, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized employees’ § 7 
right “to improve working conditions through resort to administrative 
and judicial forums . . . .”14 The Supreme Court explained,  
Congress knew well enough that labor’s cause often is advanced on 
fronts other than collective bargaining and grievance settlement within 
the immediate employment context. It recognized this fact by 
choosing, as the language of [§ 7] makes clear, to protect concerted 
 
 5. Id. § 157. 
 6. Id. § 158(a)(1). 
 7. Ellen Dannin, NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 
223, 241 (2005). 
 8. See Michael P. Spellman & Jeffrey D. Slanker, Social Media, At-Will Employment, and 
Internal Investigations: The Ever-Expanding Reach of the National Labor Relations Board to Union 
and Non-Union Workplaces, 32 Trial Advoc. Q. 36, 38 (2013). 
 9. Dannin, supra note 7, at 230. 
 10. Id. at 241. 
 11. See Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality, 
76 Am. Soc. Rev. 513, 517 (2011). 
 12. See generally Abraham L. Gitlow, Ebb and Flow in America’s Trade Unions: The Present 
Prospect, 63 Lab. L.J. 123 (2012) (focusing on the history and development of the trade union 
movement in the United States following World War II); CCH Human Resource Compliance 
Library, Unions: Impact of Union Decline on Wage Inequality ¶ 94,427 (2015), 2012 WL 5470150. 
 13. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2016). 
 14. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 566 (1978). 
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activities for the somewhat broader purpose of “mutual aid or 
protection.”15  
Thus, the Supreme Court found that the § 7 catchall generally included 
collective legal action when such action was for the purpose of improving 
working conditions. 
While the Supreme Court has suggested that § 7 protects legal 
collective activity generally, the Court has not spoken on the precise 
issue of whether pursuing a class action is a protected § 7 activity. The 
issue of whether class actions are a protected § 7 activity has become 
significant in the employment context because of the recent increase in 
class action waivers contained in employment arbitration agreements.16 
Importantly, the Supreme Court has found that substantive employment 
rights cannot be waived in an arbitration agreement. As a result, whether 
[pursuit of a] class action is a substantive right under the NLRA, as opposed 
to a mere procedural right as indicated by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, can have a considerable impact on employee rights.17 When 
an employee enters into an arbitration agreement with an employer, she 
is agreeing to arbitrate any legal claims covered by the agreement, rather 
than filing a lawsuit in court.18 The parties to an arbitration agreement 
can tailor many of the terms of the agreement, including what legal 
claims will be arbitrated.19 These agreements are often mandatory in the 
sense that the employee must consent to the arbitration agreement as a 
condition of employment.20 When an arbitration agreement contains a 
provision that prohibits employees from arbitrating their claims as a 
class, as defined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,21 courts tend to 
refer to these types of provisions as a class action waiver.22 Some 
provisions also prohibit collective action. The significant difference 
between a class action and a collective action is that in a collective action, 
individuals must affirmatively give their consent before becoming a part 
of the class and being bound by any court judgment in favor of the 
collective.23 In a class action, all similarly situated employees are 
 
 15. Id. at 565. 
 16. Nantiya Ruan, What’s Left to Remedy Wage Theft? How Arbitration Mandates That Bar Class 
Actions Impact Low-Wage Workers, 2012 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1103, 1125–26. 
 17. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). 
 18. See Yongdan Li, Applying the Doctrine of Unconscionability to Employment Arbitration 
Agreements, with Emphasis on Class Action/Arbitration Waivers, 31 Whittier L. Rev. 665, 665 (2010). 
 19. Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404 (2008); see also American Express 
Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (finding that 9 U.S.C. § 2 reflects the principle 
that arbitration is a matter of contract and that courts must enforce the terms the parties themselves 
have agreed on). 
 20. Li, supra note 18, at 665. 
 21. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 
 22. Li, supra note 18, at 700–01. 
 23. 1 McLaughlin on Class Actions § 2:16 (11th ed. 2014), Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2014). 
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automatically a part of the class.24 This Note will focus mainly on class 
actions and class action waivers because the courts and the National 
Labor Relations Board (“Board”) has mainly focused on class actions in 
determining whether these waivers are valid in arbitration agreements. 
The Board is the federal agency that investigates and resolves 
complaints under the NLRA.25 Per this authority, the Board has found 
that pursuing a class action is a substantive right under § 7.26 Since 
substantive rights cannot be waived through agreement according to 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, § 7 rights cannot be waived through 
arbitration agreements.27 In coming to this conclusion, the Board relied 
on the unique nature of the NLRA in providing substantive collective rights, 
as opposed to the individual rights established by other employment 
statutes.28 The courts, on the other hand, have largely held that pursuing 
a class action is a procedural right because it is codified in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and that arbitration agreements with class action 
waivers must be upheld under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 
which establishes that arbitration agreements are generally enforceable.29 
The issue of class action waivers in employment arbitration 
agreements has yet to be decided by the Supreme Court. Any decisions 
by the Supreme Court on the issue will be binding on the NLRB and the 
courts.30 Until then, the Board and the courts are free to diverge from 
one another on the issue, leaving the collective rights of employees in a 
state of uncertainty.31 The stakes are particularly high for low-wage 
workers, who often have legitimate claims with low, individual value.32 
Employees, and particularly low-wage workers, struggle to bring claims 
on their own because of litigation costs, lack of financial resources, and 
fear of retaliation from employers.33 Thus, courts have recognized the 
importance of class actions as a sound option for these employees.34 This 
is most clear in the context of wage and hour litigation where claims are 
usually of low value.35 
In response to a surge in employee class actions, employers have 
increasingly adopted arbitration agreements containing class and 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Who We Are, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). 
 26. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274, at *1 (Jan. 3, 2012). 
 27. Id. at *12; see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). 
 28. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 2014 WL 54654, at *12 (Oct. 28, 2014). 
 29. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2014). 
 30. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1003 (2005) 
(Stevens, J., concurring). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Ruan, supra note 16, at 1107–08 (explaining that a worker is classified as low wage when she 
earns on average $27,000 or less per year while working at least thirty hours a week). 
 33. Id. at 1118–20. 
 34. Id. at 1115. 
 35. Id. at 1116. 
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collective action waivers.36 Part I of this Note outlines how low-wage 
workers are particularly affected by these arbitration provisions with 
class action waivers, especially in the wage and hour context. This Part 
further explains how class actions help carry out Congress’ goals under 
the NLRA by preventing industrial strife through a level playing field 
between employers and low-wage workers. Part II examines recent court 
decisions dealing with the issue of class action waivers in employment 
arbitration agreements and argues that these decisions have set a 
dangerous precedent by restricting an employee’s § 7 rights in two ways. 
First, these decisions unjustifiably narrow the definition of “concerted 
activity for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection” under the Act by 
determining that pursuit of class actions is not a substantive right under 
the NLRA, setting the stage for further limitations on § 7 rights. Second, 
these decisions indicate that the FAA can render an employee’s § 7 
rights meaningless because these decisions have indicated that 
substantive § 7 rights can be waived through arbitration agreements. In 
Part III, this Note will present proposals address the problems that 
recent court decisions have relied on in upholding class action waivers in 
the employment context. First, the Supreme Court, should it decide this 
issue in the future, should find that the right to pursue class actions is a 
substantive right under § 7. Such a holding is consistent with the 
substantive nature of the NLRA and will preclude the narrowing of § 7 
rights, while avoiding conflict with the FAA. Alternatively, a narrow 
amendment to the FAA explicitly prohibiting waiver in an agreement of 
the right to class actions should be considered in order to ensure that 
low-wage workers will be legally protected against workplace 
exploitation. Without these fixes, class action waivers will leave low-wage 
workers largely unprotected against employer exploitation, as they will 
effectively be precluded from seeking legal redress for many employer 
violations. 
I.  Impact of Class Action Waivers on Low-Wage Workers 
This Note will first show that employer violations against low-wage 
workers are widespread and that class actions have helped many of these 
workers reclaim their employment rights. Furthermore, the Note will 
demonstrate that class actions help support the purpose of the NLRA by 
examining how class action waivers financially bar low-wage workers 
from addressing employer violations and promote other, more disruptive 
means of redress. 
 
 36. Joane Deschenaux, Appeals Court Rejects NLRB Conclusion That Class-Action Waivers Violate 
Labor Law, Soc’y for Hum. Resource Mgmt. (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.shrm.org/legalissues/ 
federalresources/pages/appeals-court-rejects-nlrb-class-action-waivers-decision.aspx. 
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Recent studies have shown that the employment rights of low-wage 
workers are frequently violated. For example, a 2013 Bay Area study of 
500 low-wage workers showed that almost all of the workers had been 
denied a rest or meal break at one time during their working life.37 More 
than a third of them had been denied sick leave and about half of the 
workers had work-related illnesses or injuries.38 A majority of the 
workers had experienced verbal abuse or degrading treatment at some 
point, with more than a quarter of women reporting experiences of 
sexual harassment in the workplace.39 This illustration is consistent with 
“an emerging body of evidence suggest[ing] that the systematic violation 
of employment and labor laws is common in a number of low-wage 
industries.”40 Common violations include retaliation for worker complaints, 
unsafe working conditions, and avoidance of worker’s compensation.41 
Evidence indicates that wage and hour violations tend to be the 
most prevalent rights violations amongst employers of low-wage 
workers.42 The Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) remains the primary 
protection for workers against wage theft.43 The FLSA establishes, 
among other employee rights, a right to overtime pay for work exceeding 
forty hours in a week.44 Claims by workers that their employers failed to 
pay them correctly have quadrupled over the last decade, and the 
majority of wage and hour litigation claims are filed under the FLSA.45 
Thus, the recent studies on wage theft, coupled with the increase in 
FLSA litigation, indicate that wage theft is an epidemic among low-wage 
workers. 
Studies show that wage theft is not restricted to a few companies or 
industries. In 2009, a survey of 4387 low-wage workers across a variety of 
industries working for large and small companies within three major U.S. 
cities found that seventy-six percent of full-time workers faced unpaid or 
underpaid overtime and twenty-six percent reported being paid less than 
minimum wage.46 It also found an overall wage theft of fifteen percent of 
the earnings of all of the workers surveyed.47 In 2010, a San Francisco-
 
 37. Charlotte S. Alexander & Arthi Prasad, Bottom-Up Workplace Law Enforcement: An 
Empirical Analysis, 89 Ind. L.J. 1069, 1085 n.66 (2014). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Annette Bernhardt et al., Employers Gone Rogue: Explaining Industry Variation in Violations 
of Workplace Laws, 66 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 808, 809 (2013). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Nantiya Ruan, Facilitating Wage Theft: How Courts Use Procedural Rules to Undermine 
Substantive Rights of Low-Wage Workers, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 727, 735–36 (2010); see also Rosemary 
Sage Jones, The FLSA Wage and Hour Epidemic, 69 Advocate 70 (2014). 
 43. 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 (West 2016). 
 44. Id. § 207. 
 45. Ruan, supra note 42, at 735; see also Jones, supra note 42. 
 46. Ruan, supra note 16, at 1110. 
 47. Id. 
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based survey found that fifty percent of Chinatown workers earn less 
than minimum wage.48 In New York City in 2012, thirty percent of 436 
retail workers interviewed reported that they worked more than forty 
hours a week without being paid overtime.49 With these statistics, it is 
evident that wage and hour violation is a systemic problem that likely 
cannot be addressed by those few individuals that have the financial 
resources to bring claims on their own. Thus, class action is an important 
tool for combatting widespread employee exploitation since it allows 
individual employees to pool their resources for one case. 
Recent lawsuits show that class actions have been the only way 
through which workers have been able to significantly address wage 
violations occurring across industries. Workers in construction, garment 
factories, nursing homes, agriculture, poultry processing, and restaurants 
have all suffered extensive and systemic wage theft, and studies indicate 
that “billions of dollars in wages are being illegally stolen from millions 
of workers each and every year.”50 The vast number of recent wage theft 
claims brought by low-wage workers from these industries shows that 
they are particularly affected by wage theft compared to other workers. 
For example, “Wal-Mart . . . paid $352 million dollars to settle sixty-three 
unpaid wages lawsuits in forty-two states . . . .”51 Another FLSA 
collective action regarding misappropriation of servers’ tips and a failure 
to pay overtime at a restaurant chain “settled for $800,000 after sixty-five 
servers opted in to the lawsuit in a case.”52 Similarly, employees of a car 
wash won a lawsuit alleging that their employer paid them less than 
minimum wage, did not give them adequate breaks, and even paid some 
workers only in tips.53 
These cases and surveys show that wage theft is a particularly 
serious problem affecting low-wage workers, and that class actions have 
been, and should continue to be, the primary tool workers use to 
alleviate this problem. 
A. Class Action Waivers and the Purpose of the NLRA 
Class action waivers undermine the purpose of the NLRA in two 
ways. First, class action waivers leave low-wage workers with almost no 
bargaining power. The collective rights established by the NLRA gave 
employees more bargaining power through protected means of addressing 
workplace grievances. Class actions serve this purpose by protecting 
employees from employer exploitation. Class action waivers force 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Ruan, supra note 42, at 737 (quoting Kim Bobo, Wage Theft in America 6 (2009)). 
 51. Ruan, supra note 16, at 1109–10. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 1110. 
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workers to address workplace grievances individually and without the 
shield of anonymity, thus allowing employers to exploit these 
vulnerabilities. Second, with decreasing access to union protection and 
the high costs of litigation, the next most likely alternative is disruptive 
collective action, which the NLRA specifically aims to prevent. 
The minimal bargaining power of unskilled, low-wage workers 
across industries reflects their vulnerability in the face of wage theft and 
other opportunities for employers to exploit them. Other common 
examples of exploitation include: 
[C]ashiers at retail chains that are misclassified as “assistant managers” 
and lose thousands in unpaid overtime; restaurant workers who have 
their tips “reallocated” to owners and management; truck drivers who 
have their hours shaved; car wash workers paid below minimum wage; 
temporary staffing agency workers who lose premium overtime pay 
through creative time keeping.54 
These examples show that there are some common vulnerabilities 
shared among low-wage workers in different industries. Thus, the 
protection of class actions can address the exploitation of employees in a 
variety of occupations. 
There are a number of factors that leave low-wage workers with 
little bargaining power, particularly in the wage theft context. In addition 
to the financial barrier to individual wage and hour litigation, lack of 
knowledge and fear of retaliation are also concerns for low-wage 
workers. Low-wage workers, who are often low-skilled workers and at-
will employees, are less likely to challenge workplace violations in times 
of high unemployment because many employers consider them easily 
replaceable.55 Unchallenged violations are especially prevalent in industries 
where the low-wage workers are immigrants with limited English 
proficiency, have minimal familiarity with their legal rights, or are fearful 
and lack motivation based on their immigrant status.56 Furthermore, 
many low-wage workers remain unaware that their employers have 
violated their legal rights until they are informed of the violations.57 Thus, 
many low-wage workers will be discouraged from claiming wage and 
hour violations on an individual basis because they fear or anticipate 
retaliation from the employer who can terminate or discipline employees 
at will or who can expose their immigration status. Class and collective 
actions can help address these vulnerabilities. 
 
 54. Id. at 1109. 
 55. CCH Human Resource Compliance Library, Employee Relations: Causes of Turnover 
¶ 46,417, 2012 WL 5934978; Yungsuhn Park, The Immigrant Workers Union: Challenges Facing Low-
Wage Immigrant Workers in Los Angeles, 12 Asian L.J. 67, 98–99 (2005). 
 56. See Llezlie Green Coleman, Procedural Hurdles and Thwarted Efficiency: Immigration Relief 
in Wage and Hour Collective Actions, 16 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 1, 7–8 (2013). 
 57. Ruan, supra note 16, at 1121. 
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There are two separate procedures through which workers can 
collectively file claims, depending on whether their claims fall under the 
FLSA. Section 216(b) of the FLSA, which deals specifically with wage 
and hour violations, provides that an action to recover for violations of 
the FLSA “may be maintained against any employer . . . by any one or 
more employees for and on behalf of himself or themselves and other 
employees similarly situated.”58 While the FLSA authorizes collective 
legal action specifically for wage and hour claims, Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23 governs class actions generally.59 Class actions, therefore, 
can be used for a broader range of employment claims. 
Collective actions and class actions have many similar protections 
for low-wage workers against employer exploitation, as will be discussed 
in this Part, but there is one significant difference that makes Rule 23 
class actions superior to collective actions for low-wage workers. Under 
Rule 23, putative class members must opt out in order to be removed 
from each case, meaning that all employees that fit the requirements of 
the class are automatically members of the class until they affirmatively 
decline this inclusion.60 Rule 23 thus alleviates the fear of employer 
retaliation for bringing a claim because it only requires a few named 
plaintiffs, usually those who initiate the claim, to represent the class as 
the plaintiffs in the case.61 In comparison, under § 216(b), workers, once 
notified of the claim and how to join it, must opt in by filing a written 
consent, thus providing little protection against fear of retaliation 
because the employer can readily identify the individual and her 
association with the claim as listed on the face of the claim.62 Both rules, 
however, require notice of the suit to similarly situated employees.63 
Notice provides workers with information regarding their wage rights 
and the potential violations of these rights, and also encourages them to 
seek legal counsel.64 Thus, many workers who are vulnerable to employer 
exploitation because they are unaware of their rights or violations 
thereof have increased protection through FLSA collective actions and 
through Rule 23 class actions. All it takes is one victim aware of the 
employer violations to bring a lawsuit on behalf of those low-wage 
workers similarly wronged.65 Because class actions address many of the 
vulnerabilities of low-wage workers in the employment context through 
the opt-out mechanism, it serves an important purpose of the NLRA by 
 
 58. 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (West 2016). 
 59. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 
 60. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A). 
 61. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 
 62. 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (West 2016). 
 63. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). 
 64. Ruan, supra note 16, at 1121–22. 
 65. Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 
90 Or. L. Rev. 703, 722 (2012). 
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helping to equalize the bargaining power between employer and 
employee. 
Another obstacle for low-wage workers is the financial barrier to 
wage and hour litigation. As noted above, a worker is classified as low-
wage when she earns on average $27,000 or less per year while working 
at least thirty hours per week, and lost wages are often important to 
these individual workers in order to meet the cost of living.66 However, 
attorneys usually do not take on individual wage and hour cases because 
the costs and resources of litigation are unjustified by the relatively 
minimal amount of damages, and low-wage workers generally cannot 
afford to pay for expensive litigation costs out of pocket.67 Effectively, 
this means that if low-wage workers are always required to bring their 
wage and hour claims on an individual basis, the vast majority will not 
have their claims heard and will not receive the wages withheld from 
them. In comparison, the ability to aggregate claims through class actions 
eliminates the financial barrier and ultimately allows low-wage workers 
to litigate their wage and hour claims. 
Beyond equalizing bargaining power, the NLRA also seeks to 
safeguard commerce from disruptions such as strikes and picketing.68 A 
primary purpose of the NLRA is to channel industrial strife into orderly 
collective bargaining, and class action waivers undermine this purpose 
because bargaining power and industrial strife are correlative: “[T]he 
policy justification of conferring bargaining power on employees is to 
prevent strikes and industrial unrest that may in turn decrease wages and 
purchasing power, which ultimately may disrupt the market for goods in 
interstate commerce.”69 Thus, Congress has found that equality of 
bargaining power through collective rights is necessary to prevent 
aggravation of economic depression and instability and to ensure the free 
flow of interstate commerce.70 
The Board has said that “[b]locking this channel [of class actions] 
would only push employees toward other, more disruptive forms of 
concerted activity.”71 As discussed above in Part I.B, class actions help to 
equalize the bargaining power between low-wage workers and their 
employers. In light of the decline in unions, which evidence shows has 
 
 66. See Ruan, supra note 16, at 1107–08. 
 67. Id. at 1118–19. 
 68. 22 Ill. Practice, The Law of Medical Practice in Illinois § 37:2 (3d ed. 2015), Westlaw 
(database updated Feb. 2015); Seth Kupferberg, Political Strikes, Labor Law, and Democratic Rights, 
71 Va. L. Rev. 685, 686 (1985). 
 69. Michael C. Duff, What Brady v. N.F.L. Teaches About the Devolution of Labor Law, 52 
Washburn L.J. 429, 470 (2013). 
 70. Comparison of S. 2926 and S. 1958, at 15 (Comm. Print 1935), reprinted in 1 Nat’l Labor 
Relations Bd., S. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 74th Cong., Legislative History of the National 
Labor Relations Act, 1935, at 1338 (1985). 
 71. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 2014 WL 54654, at *10 (Oct. 28, 2014). 
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already led to an increase in wage inequality,72 and an increase in class 
action waivers in arbitration agreements,73 low-wage workers will 
continue to have low bargaining power and be vulnerable to depressed 
wages. Without access to an orderly forum to address their grievances, 
any current employee unrest will likely divert to more disruptive forms 
of collective activity—such as strikes—subverting the goal of the NLRA 
to “eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free 
flow of commerce.”74 
Ultimately, class action waivers will leave many workers vulnerable 
to exploitation because of their low bargaining power, directly undermining 
a primary purpose of the NLRA to equalize bargaining power. The 
inequality in bargaining power then promotes the use of disruptive forms 
of employee collective activity, as employees seeking to combat 
workplace violations have limited tools of redress beyond class actions. 
Thus, if class action waivers are found to be valid in employment 
arbitration agreements, the goals of the NLRA could become futile. 
II.  The Current Tug-of-War over Class Action Waivers in 
Employment Arbitration Agreements 
This Part addresses the divergence between the courts and the 
Board on the issue of enforceability of class action waivers in employment 
arbitration agreements and examines the key arguments of each in 
rendering conflicting opinions. While neither the Board nor the courts 
are bound by the decisions of the other, each tends to address the 
arguments of the other since § 7 rights claims often go through the hands 
of both. 
The process of addressing employer violations often begins when an 
employee files a claim against the employer in state or federal court.75 
However, if there is an arbitration agreement with a class action waiver, 
the ability of low-wage workers to proceed with these claims depends 
largely on whether a court will enforce the class action waiver and force 
individual arbitration.76 In comparison to the claims of individual 
employment rights violations brought in courts, an employee who 
believes her employer has infringed on her § 7 rights has the option of 
filing an unfair labor practices claim with the Board, which has exclusive 
jurisdiction over such claims.77 Employees have thus filed unfair labor 
practice claims on the basis that class action waivers infringe upon their 
 
 72. See Western & Rosenfeld, supra note 11, at 513. 
 73. Ruan, supra note 16, at 1125–26. 
 74. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2016). 
 75. Jones, supra note 42, at 74. 
 76. See infra Part II.B. 
 77. Laura L. Mall, Practical Implications of Murphy Oil on Employee Waivers: An Ecological 
Disaster or a Dissenter’s Pipeline to Freedom?, 89 Fla. Bus. J. 38, 38 (2015). 
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§ 7 rights. Board decisions may be appealed to a court of appeals, but 
neither the Board nor the courts are bound by the decisions of the other 
on the issue of unfair labor practice claims, including the claim that class 
action waivers violate § 7.78 However, the courts of appeals are required 
to defer to the Board’s interpretation of § 7 if such interpretation has a 
reasonable basis in law.79 The court of appeals and the Board are bound 
by the decisions of the Supreme Court, should the Supreme Court ever 
decide the issue.80 
The enforceability of class action waivers is increasingly significant 
because evidence indicates that arbitration agreements in employment 
contracts are on the rise and have been for several years: “[T]he number 
of employees covered by employment arbitration plans administered by 
the American Arbitration Association increased from 3 million 
employees in 1997 to 6 million in 2001.”81 In 2008, it was estimated that 
about fifteen percent to twenty-five percent of employers nationally had 
adopted mandatory arbitration procedures.82 Thus, a significant number 
of low-wage workers must adhere to the provisions of employment 
arbitration agreements, and the use of class action waivers in these 
arbitration agreements is already fairly common.83 This increase in 
arbitration agreements in employment contracts threatens the ability of 
many low-wage workers to have their wage, hour, and other low-value 
claims heard if class action waivers in these agreements are held to be 
enforceable. 
The enforceability of class action waivers in arbitration agreements 
is still uncertain because while some courts have found them 
unenforceable, most courts have upheld such provisions in employment 
arbitration agreements. The few courts that have found class action 
waivers in arbitration agreements unenforceable have done so on the 
basis of unconscionability or public policy, because such a provision 
operates solely to the advantage of the employer.84 However, the 
majority of courts deciding this precise issue have found that class action 
waivers are valid in employment arbitration agreements, primarily for 
 
 78. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1003 (2005) 
(Stevens, J., concurring). 
 79. 12 Emp’t Coordinator Labor Relations § 52:45, Deference Given to NLRB’s Interpretations 
of Law, Westlaw (database updated Mar. 2016). 
 80. Ross E. Davies, Remedial Nonacquiescence, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 65, 90 (2003). 
 81. Stacey L. Pine, Employment Arbitration Agreements and the Future of Class-Action Waivers, 
4 Am. U. Lab. & Emp. L.F. 1, 11 (2014). 
 82. Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the 
Sound and Fury?, 11 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 405, 411 (2007). 
 83. Christopher T. Vrountas, Class Action Waivers and Arbitration Agreements Are Enforceable, 
for Now, SES Legal Educ. Blog (June 2, 2014), http://www.sterlingeducation.com/the-sterling-blog/ 
bid/101658/Class-Action-Waivers-and-Arbitration-Agreements-Are-Enforceable-For-Now. 
 84. Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp., 508 F.3d 49, 59 (1st Cir. 2007); Ingle v. Circuit City 
Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1176 (9th Cir. 2003); Gentry v. Super. Ct., 42 Cal. 4th 443, 452 (2007). 
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two reasons: (1) a class action is not a substantive right under the NLRA, 
rather it is a procedural right and thus can be waived; and (2) the FAA 
dictates that an arbitration agreement must be enforced to its terms, even 
in an employment context where the employer has significantly more 
bargaining power.85 The Board, on the other hand, has consistently struck 
down class action waivers in arbitration agreements as violations of 
employees’ § 7 rights.86 This Note argues that the Board is correct 
because the courts’ decisions have provided little basis for narrowing 
employees’ § 7 rights by excluding class actions from these rights. 
Furthermore, because the Board has reasonably interpreted § 7 to 
include the right to pursue a class action, the courts should defer to this 
interpretation. 
A. Interpretation of the Section 7 Catchall  
The Board and the Supreme Court have often interpreted the § 7 
catchall broadly in order to ensure that employees can maintain 
bargaining power through collective activity in various workplaces.87 The 
right to engage in “concerted activities . . . for the purpose of mutual aid 
or other protection” under § 7 thus acts as a catchall for collective 
activity.88 The Board and the courts have analyzed the catchall as 
containing two separate elements: (1) concerted activity; and (2) mutual 
aid or protection.89 Both elements must be established in order for the 
employee activity to constitute a protected § 7 activity.90 This Part will 
examine the wide boundaries established by the Supreme Court for both 
elements. 
The Supreme Court has established a broad reading of “concerted 
activity” under § 7, explaining that “[t]here is no indication that Congress 
intended to limit this protection to situations in which an employee’s 
activity and that of [] fellow employees combine with one another in any 
 
 85. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 360 (5th Cir. 2013); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young 
LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 297 n.8 (2d Cir. 2013); Richards v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 744 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th 
Cir. 2013); Jasso v. Money Mart Express, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Morvant v. P.F. 
Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 831 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Delock v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, 
Inc., No. 4:11-cv-520-DPM, 2012 WL 3150391 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 1, 2012); Nelsen v. Legacy Partners 
Residential, 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 198 (Ct. App. 2012); Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 142 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 372 (Ct. App. 2012), appeal docketed, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 324 (Cal. Sept. 19, 2012). 
 86. Brinker Int’l Payroll Co., 27-CA-110765, 2014 WL 2547547 (N.L.R.B. June 4, 2014); Flyte 
Tyme Worldwide, 04-CA-115437, 2014 WL 2507633 (N.L.R.B. June 3, 2014); Fairfield Imports, LLC, 
20-CA-035259, 2014 WL 2507632 (N.L.R.B. June 3, 2014); Labor Ready Sw., Inc., 31-CA-072914, 2014 
WL 1692778 (N.L.R.B. Apr. 29, 2014). 
 87. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 567 (1978). 
 88. Id. at 558. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See id. at 564–66; see also Michael D. Schwartz, A Substantive Right to Class Proceedings: The 
False Conflict Between the FAA and NLRA, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2945, 2963 (2013). 
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particular way.”91 An individual employee can undertake “concerted 
activity” when she acts as a representative for at least one other 
employee or when she intends to induce group activity.92 Protected § 7 
concerted activity has included employees acting alone to vindicate rights 
statutorily provided to all employees and an individual bringing a group 
complaint to the attention of management.93 
The definition of “mutual aid or protection” is similarly broad. The 
Supreme Court has found that an employee acts for mutual aid or 
protection when she seeks to improve the terms and conditions of 
employment.94 This includes action taken to improve working conditions 
“in administrative and judicial forums,” such as when employees initiate 
appeals to legislators or agencies and file judicial actions.95 Employees 
who join in a lawsuit together against their employer are engaging in 
protected § 7 activity when the lawsuit seeks to address employer actions 
that have been detrimental to their working conditions.96 The Court has 
found that the broad language of “mutual aid or protection” indicated 
that Congress intended to protect a wide variety of employee concerted 
activities because it knew that labor disputes were not always best 
resolved in the immediate employment context.97 The Court has held that 
arbitrarily limiting the employee actions that constitute protected § 7 
rights would “frustrate the policy of the [NLRA] to protect the right of 
workers to act together to better their working conditions.”98 Section 7 
thus protects different forms of collective action—including collective 
legal action—which tend to advance and protect employee rights and 
federal labor policy. 
B. Class Actions as a Substantive Section 7 Right 
This Part addresses Supreme Court precedent and Board decisions 
to argue that pursuit of a class action is a substantive § 7 right. In D.R. 
Horton, Inc., the Board first addressed the issue of whether a class action 
prohibition in an arbitration agreement violated § 7.99 This case involved 
a typical employment arbitration agreement that prohibited employees 
from pursuing class actions and that required employees to sign the 
 
 91. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822, 835 (1984). 
 92. Id. at 831. 
 93. Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 1000 (1975); Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986). 
 94. Eastex, 437 U.S. at 565. 
 95. Id. at 566; Michael D. Schwartz, Note, A Substantive Right to Class Proceedings: The False 
Conflict Between the FAA and NLRA, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2945, 2965 (2013). 
 96. See Health Enters. of Am., Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 214 (1986); Trinity Trucking & Materials Corp., 
221 N.L.R.B. 364 (1975). 
 97. Eastex, 437 U.S. at 565. 
 98. Id. at 567 (quoting NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962)). 
 99. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274, at *1 (Jan. 3, 2012). 
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agreement as a condition of employment.100 As in many cases where an 
employer infringes on an employee’s § 7 rights, the employee in this case 
filed an unfair labor practice claim with the Board when his employer 
refused to submit to class arbitration.101 For the first time, the Board 
applied § 7 to class actions and interpreted it as including the right to 
pursue class action.102 This Part examines the Board’s interpretation and 
argues that the interpretation of class action as a substantive § 7 right is 
reasonable and should thus be deferred to by the courts. 
In finding that pursuing a class action is a substantive § 7 right, the 
Board relied heavily on precedent that strongly favors including 
collective legal action as a protected concerted activity under § 7.103 The 
Board relied on Supreme Court precedent that substantive rights cannot 
be contractually waived in holding that the class action waiver violated § 
7.104 Because of this precedent, the right to pursue a class action cannot 
be waived in an arbitration agreement if it is a § 7 right and because an 
arbitration agreement is a contract. Beyond this precedent, there is 
ample support for the Board’s conclusion that pursuing class actions is a 
substantive right under § 7 given the wide boundaries of the § 7 catchall, 
as discussed in Part II.A. 
Employees’ pursuit of a class action is a collective activity that fits 
well within the § 7 catchall as defined by the courts and the Board.105 The 
named plaintiffs in class actions act in a representative capacity, a 
scenario that the Supreme Court deemed “concerted activity” under 
§ 7.106 Class actions also satisfy the “mutual aid or protection” element 
when employees in a class action bring suit for an employer’s systemic 
violations under state and federal employment statutes.107 Perhaps most 
importantly, pursuing a class action is a collective activity that works to 
advance federal labor policy as defined by the NLRA. The NLRA 
promotes the right of employees to engage in collective activity in order 
to combat the inequalities that are often present in the employer-
employee relationship.108 In the Board’s most recent decision regarding 
class action waivers in employment arbitration contracts, Murphy Oil, 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at *10. 
 104. Id. at *12. 
 105. See cases cited supra note 84. 
 106. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822, 831 (1984) (finding that an employee is engaged in 
concerted activity when “the employee acts as a representative of at least one other employee”). 
 107. Schwartz, supra note 95, at 2966 (“The Board had previously held that a suit filed by multiple 
employees is a form of concerted activity, and so it concluded that the same classification should apply 
to claims brought on a classwide basis. This is true even if the suit is initiated unilaterally, on behalf of 
other employees.”). 
 108. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2016). 
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the Board found that there was no basis for excluding collective legal 
action, specifically class action, because class action, as a substantive 
right, reinforces the primary policy considerations underlying the 
NLRA.109 The Board relied on this right in reaching its decision in D.R. 
Horton, and courts have reaffirmed this right in many cases that remain 
good law today.110 
In comparison, some courts that have addressed the issue of class 
action waivers in employment contracts have disagreed with the Board 
on the issue of whether class action is a substantive right or a procedural 
right.111 These courts have ignored the established judicial precedent 
defining what a substantive right is by ignoring the nature of the 
substantive rights under the NLRA. For example, in declining to follow 
the Board’s decision in D.R. Horton, the Fifth Circuit—the only federal 
circuit court to have addressed this issue of class action as a substantive 
right thus far—found that class action is not a § 7 right.112 In particular, 
the Fifth Circuit relied on Supreme Court precedent that found there is 
no substantive right to class action under the Age Discrimination 
Employment Act and the FLSA.113 This Subpart argues that the Fifth 
Circuit and other courts have erroneously relied on cases that dealt with 
collective legal action brought under other employment statutes, such as 
the FLSA, as precedent supporting the notion that collective legal action 
is not a substantive right.114 In Board decisions after D.R. Horton, the 
Board explained that while the underlying legal claims involved the 
FLSA, it was the NLRA that was the source of the relevant, substantive 
right to pursue those claims concertedly.115 In comparison, other 
employment statutes create only individual rights, and under these 
statutes, class action is merely a procedure through which these claims 
can be brought. The NLRA is unique in that it creates substantive 
collective rights. Thus, these courts have failed to address the unique 
nature of the NLRA, which is important in determining whether class 
action is a substantive right under the NLRA that cannot be waived 
through agreement. 
Regarding whether a right is substantive or procedural, the Supreme 
Court provides: “[t]he most helpful way . . . of defining a substantive 
 
 109. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 2014 WL 54654, at *8 (Oct. 28, 2014) (“Indeed, 
concerted legal activity would seem, if anything, to be a favored form of concerted activity under the 
Act because it would have the least potential for economic disruption, the harm that Congress sought 
to prevent in enacting the NLRA, as Section 1 of the Act explains.”). 
 110. Peter Danysh, Employing the Right Test: The Importance of Restricting AT&T v. Concepcion 
to Consumer Adhesion Contracts, 50 Hous. L. Rev. 1433, 1465–66 (2013). 
 111. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 357 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 2014 WL 5465454, at *12 (Oct. 28, 2014). 
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rule . . . is as a right granted for one or more nonprocedural reasons, for 
some purpose or purposes not having to do with the fairness or efficiency 
of the litigation process.”116 For example, collective action under FLSA 
§ 216(b) is not a substantive right, but it is a mechanism through which 
employees can better ensure fairness and efficiency in the litigation of 
wage and hour claims. The purpose of the collective action mechanism of 
§ 216(b) is to give plaintiffs the advantage of lower individual costs 
through the pooling of resources. In general, such collective action 
mechanisms also promote judicial efficiency by allowing for “resolution 
in one proceeding of common issues of law and fact.”117 The substantive 
rights of the FLSA, on the other hand, focus on individual rights: “in 
passing the FLSA, Congress did not state support for collective action; 
rather, its intention was to force employers to compensate workers for 
individual violations in wage and hour provisions to ensure workers 
earned enough to reinvest in the economy and boost the nation out of 
the Great Depression.”118 Thus, in the context of the FLSA, collective 
legal action does not serve the statute’s substantive purpose of 
establishing employees’ right to fair wages, but rather serves the purpose 
of streamlining litigation of these claims. 
Similarly, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) 
establishes individual rights and largely follows FLSA § 216(b) by 
incorporating the procedures of that provision into its own authorization 
for collective legal action.119 The substantive purpose of the ADEA is to 
fight age discrimination in the workforce through individual rights to 
bring age discrimination claims against employers.120 Like the FLSA, 
class and collective actions are mechanisms under the ADEA to ensure 
fairness and efficiency in bringing these claims: “The ADEA and the 
FLSA provide individuals with a cause of action, including access to a 
judicial forum and class action mechanisms, as a means to vindicate their 
other statutory rights regarding age discrimination and wages.”121 The 
ADEA and FLSA are representative of employment statutes that 
establish individual rights and are distinct from the substantive nature of 
the NLRA, which establishes collective rights. 
 
 116. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 36–37 n.53 (1985) (citing John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth 
of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693, 725 (1974)). 
 117. Kristin M. Stastny, Eleventh Circuit Treatment of Certification of Collective Actions Under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act: A Remedial Statute Without a Remedy?, 62 U. Miami L. Rev. 1191, 1203 
(2008). 
 118. Fox Harris, supra note 1, at 107–08. 
 119. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2016). 
 120. Colleen Gale Treml, Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Department: Pushing Plaintiffs down 
the ADEA Path in Age Discrimination Suits, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 995, 995 (1990). 
 121. Note, Deference and the Federal Arbitration Act: The NLRB’s Determination of Substantive 
Statutory Rights, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 907, 927 (2015). 
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The courts that declined to follow D.R. Horton in finding that 
pursuing class actions is not a substantive right under the NLRA have 
failed to address the unique nature of the NLRA, and instead have 
incorrectly relied on the employment statutes that establish individual 
rights. In D.R. Horton, the court explained, “the right allegedly violated 
by [D.R. Horton’s arbitration agreement] is not the right to be paid the 
minimum wage or overtime under the FLSA, but the right to engage in 
collective action under the NLRA.”122 The purpose of collective action 
under the NLRA, including collective legal action, is to equalize 
bargaining power between employees and employers and to ensure 
industrial stability.123 As discussed above in Part I, class actions serve this 
purpose, in addition to efficiency and fairness purposes. Because class 
actions have nonprocedural purposes under the NLRA, pursuing a class 
action is a substantive § 7 right. While § 7 does not create a right to be 
certified as a class under Rule 23, it creates a substantive right to pursue 
class action procedures as a protected “concerted activity” when done for 
the mutual aid and benefit of other employees, which includes pursuing 
claims under other employment statutes.124 Thus, the Fifth Circuit did not 
persuasively explain why pursuing class actions is not a substantive right 
when it fits under the broad definition of “concerted activities . . . for 
other mutual aid and protection.”125 Upholding the Fifth Circuit’s 
reasoning, instead of the Board’s decisions to invalidate class action 
waivers, would therefore unjustifiably restrict § 7 activity. 
C. The Federal Arbitration Act as Applied to Employment 
Arbitration Agreements with Class Action Waivers 
This Subpart focuses on the courts’ application of the Federal 
Arbitration Act (“FAA”) to class action waivers in employment 
arbitration agreements. Many courts have used the liberal federal policy 
and Supreme Court precedent encouraging the use of arbitration to 
justify upholding class action waivers in employment arbitration 
agreements, while ignoring the strong federal policy of protecting 
employee rights underlying the NLRA. Such decisions can have dangerous 
implications for employee rights because these courts are prioritizing the 
goals of the FAA over the goals of the NLRA. 
The FAA essentially establishes that an arbitration agreement and 
all of its terms are generally enforceable.126 There are only two exceptions 
to this rule: The first is the “savings clause” exception, which states that 
 
 122. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274, at *10 (Jan. 3, 2012). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. (“Rule 23 may be a procedural rule, but the Section 7 right to act concertedly by invoking 
Rule 23, Section 216(b), or other legal procedures is not.”). 
 125. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2016). 
 126. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2016). 
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an arbitration agreement is not enforceable “upon such grounds as exist 
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”127 The second 
exception is satisfied when there is another statute that conflicts and has 
a clear congressional command that overrides the FAA.128 The Supreme 
Court has read the savings clause exception narrowly, finding that 
arbitration agreements will be enforced even when there is a contrary 
state law.129 With regard to the second exception, the Supreme Court has 
held that the party opposing arbitration must demonstrate a congressional 
intent to override the FAA in the text, legislative history, or purpose of the 
conflicting statute.130 Overall, the Supreme Court has established “a 
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration” and has traditionally struck 
down any policy or law that tends to disfavor arbitration.131 
The Supreme Court’s first decision regarding the enforceability of 
class action waivers in arbitration agreements reinforced this liberal 
federal policy favoring arbitration.132 However, this case involved class 
action waivers in a consumer context, rather than an employment 
context. Since the NLRA does not apply to the consumer context, it does 
not provide support for class action as an unwaivable substantive right in 
the consumer context. In this case, the original plaintiffs, the Concepcions, 
entered into a contract with AT&T for the sale and servicing of 
cellphones.133 The contract included a provision that required all claims 
be brought in arbitration, and the arbitration provision further barred all 
class and collective actions.134 After the Concepcions filed a lawsuit 
against AT&T for breach of contract, they argued that the arbitration 
provision was unconscionable because of the class action waiver.135 
Relying on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Discover 
Bank v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court and the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Concepcions, and 
found that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable because 
“AT&T had not shown that bilateral arbitration adequately substituted 
for the deterrent effects of class actions.”136 Effectively, California’s 
Discover Bank rule classified most collective arbitration waivers in 
 
 127. Id.; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 358 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 128. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2016); AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1746; D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 358. 
 129. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
 130. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987). 
 131. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013); CompuCredit Corp. v. 
Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985). 
 132. See generally AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1740. 
 133. Id. at 1744. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 1744–45. 
 136. Id. at 1745. 
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consumer contracts as unconscionable.137 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, 
finding that the FAA preempted the California rule establishing that 
unconscionable contracts are void.138 In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court relied upon case law establishing that the primary purpose of the 
FAA is to encourage arbitration by enforcing arbitration agreements to 
their terms.139 Thus, if a state law frustrates this purpose, the FAA 
preempts the law. The Court also found that the number of parties 
involved and the added procedural requirements placed on the arbitrator 
relative to class certification would further frustrate arbitration by 
eliminating its advantages, which include informality, speed, and lower 
cost.140 Therefore, the Court found the arbitration agreement and its class 
action waiver enforceable because the FAA preempted any state law 
that tended to disfavor arbitration.141 
Three months after AT&T Mobility, the Board decided D.R. 
Horton, which was the first Board decision to address class action 
waivers in the employment context. Once the Board determined that the 
arbitration agreement violated the NLRA because class action was a 
substantive right, as discussed in Part II.A, the Board next considered 
whether the FAA and the NLRA conflicted on this precise issue.142 As 
the only binding precedent for the Board, the Supreme Court has 
established that if there is a conflict between the two statutes, agencies, 
such as the Board, are supposed to do their best to accommodate 
conflicting federal statutes.143 The Board, relying on this precedent, found 
that there was no conflict because the class action “waiver interferes with 
substantive statutory rights under the NLRA, and the intent of the FAA 
[under Supreme Court precedent] was to leave substantive rights 
undisturbed.”144 Thus, because the FAA does not allow the waiver of 
substantive rights, it does not conflict with the NLRA if pursuing a class 
action is a substantive right. Even if there was a conflict, the Board found 
that invalidating class action waivers in the employment context would 
represent an appropriate accommodation of the two statutes because the 
strong federal policy protecting employees’ rights, as established through 
federal statutes like the NLRA, satisfied the FAA’s savings clause 
exception.145 In coming to this conclusion, the Board found that the 
strong federal policy protecting employees’ right to engage in protected 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 1753. 
 139. Id. at 1750–51. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 1753. 
 142. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274, at *8 (Jan. 3, 2012).  
 143. Id.; Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Decisions: The Labor Board and the 
Court, 1968 Sup. Ct. Rev. 53, 72–73. 
 144. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. at *11. 
 145. Id. 
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concerted action would do little to undermine the FAA and its policy to 
encourage the use of arbitration.146 The employer’s incentive to use 
arbitration for cost and time savings would not be undermined by finding 
class action waivers unenforceable in an employment context because 
employment class actions typically involve only twenty employees.147 The 
efficiency and manageability advantages of arbitration would therefore 
remain intact with the typical class action employment arbitration, and 
thus the purpose of the FAA to encourage arbitration would not be 
undermined.148 Thus, in accommodating the two statutes, the Board 
properly considered the purposes of both statutes. 
This Note argues that, while the Board has accommodated the two 
statutes with a relatively balanced approach, many of the state and 
federal courts have given too much weight to the goals of the FAA. A 
majority of courts to date have refused to follow D.R. Horton, finding 
instead that class action waivers in arbitration agreements are 
enforceable under the FAA, regardless of context.149 Four federal circuit 
courts of appeals have addressed the issue of arbitration agreements with 
class action waivers in employment contracts.150 Three of the four federal 
circuit courts, however, provided only conclusory statements or little 
explanation in support of the decisions to disregard D.R. Horton. For 
example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, when 
declining to follow D.R. Horton in a case involving FLSA claims, stated 
that no deference is owed to the Board’s reasoning because it has no 
experience in interpreting the FAA.151 It further supported its conclusion 
by finding no contrary congressional command in the FLSA overriding 
the FAA, but did not explain why the text of the FLSA did not constitute 
a contrary congressional command.152 In declining to follow D.R. Horton, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit merely stated that it 
owed no deference to the reasoning of the Board.153 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declined to even address D.R. Horton 
because the party opposing enforcement of the arbitration agreement 
failed to raise the argument until after the parties had briefed.154 The 
 
 146. Id. at *12–13. 
 147. Id. at *11–12. 
 148. Id. at *12. 
 149. See, e.g., Jasso v. Money Mart Express, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2012); 
Morvant v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 831, 838–41 (N.D. Cal. 2012); DeLock v. 
Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 2d 784, 789–91 (E.D. Ark. 2012). 
 150. Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1054 (8th Cir. 2013); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young 
LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 297 n.8 (2d Cir. 2013); Richards v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 744 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th 
Cir. 2013); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 360 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 151. Owen, 702 F.3d at 1054. 
 152. Id. at 1055. 
 153. Sutherland, 726 F.3d at 297 n.8. 
 154. Richards, 744 F.3d at 1075. 
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conclusory reasoning of these circuit courts indicate a potentially 
dangerous trend in overriding the Board’s authority to define § 7 rights 
through the use of arbitration agreements. 
The Fifth Circuit provided more explanation for its determination 
that the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA in D.R. Horton conflicted 
with the FAA.155 The court considered whether the interpretation fit 
under either of the two exceptions to the general FAA rule that an 
arbitration agreement must be enforced to its terms.156 The court found 
that the Board had not satisfied the savings clause exception because 
class arbitration would discourage employers from pursuing arbitration 
given the added costs, time, and formality with having multiple plaintiffs, 
thereby frustrating the policy of the FAA.157 The court held that the 
second exception was also not satisfied by the NLRA because the party 
opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving a congressional 
command and that all doubts must be resolved in favor of arbitration 
because federal policy favors arbitration.158 The court held that the 
general language of the NLRA was insufficient to constitute a contrary 
congressional command.159 In particular, the court found that the lack of 
more specific words related to the issue, such as “arbitration” or “class 
action,” undermined the assertion that the NLRA contained a clear 
contrary congressional command. Therefore, the court found that the 
arbitration agreement must be enforced to its terms, including the class 
action waiver.160 
In contrast, the Board came to different conclusions than that of the 
Fifth Circuit regarding the accommodation of the two statutes. The 
Board analyzed the flaws in the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in its most 
recent decision regarding class action waivers in employment arbitration 
agreements, Murphy Oil.161 First, the Board found that invalidating 
arbitration agreements with class action waivers would not undermine 
the FAA because the NLRA does not legally conflict with the FAA, 
given the Supreme Court precedent establishing that the FAA does not 
allow the waiver of substantive rights.162 Accordingly, the Board found 
that class action waivers in an employment arbitration agreement fall 
under the savings clause exception of the FAA because these agreements 
restrict employees’ ability to partake in nondisruptive collective activity 
for the purpose of bettering the workplace, and precedent clearly finds 
 
 155. D.R. Horton, Inc., 737 F.3d at 362. 
 156. Id. at 358. 
 157. Id. at 359. 
 158. Id. at 360. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 362. 
 161. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 2014 WL 5465454, at *9 (Oct. 28, 2014). 
 162. Id. 
Wredberg-67.3.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2016 10:28 PM 
904                                             HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:881 
such agreements unlawful.163 The Board found that the second exception, 
the requirement of a contrary congressional command, was also met 
because the NLRA’s broad language clearly authorizes concerted legal 
activity, which is supported by Supreme Court precedent.164 
Alternatively, the Board pointed out that if the two statutes do 
conflict, agencies are supposed to try and accommodate conflicting 
federal statutes instead of relying on the preemption doctrine.165 The 
Board’s finding on this point is consistent with Supreme Court 
precedent.166 The Board found that the federal circuit courts, specifically 
the Fifth Circuit, did not properly accommodate the two statutes because 
they gave too much weight to the FAA and its policies.167 In particular, 
the courts merely relied on AT&T Mobility and the liberal federal policy 
favoring the FAA and arbitration in finding that the NLRA is required 
to yield to the FAA.168 However, the Board held that AT&T Mobility 
does not apply here because the case involved accommodation of two 
federal statutes, not preemption of state law, which was the issue in 
AT&T Mobility. Furthermore, the Board pointed out that the Supreme 
Court has made clear that every federal statute has limits,169 so a liberal 
federal policy does not mean the FAA is limitless. Because the courts did 
not provide justification beyond the liberal policy favoring arbitration for 
finding that the FAA trumped the NLRA in this case, “the majority 
never persuasively . . . explained why, if there is tension between the 
NLRA and the FAA, it is the FAA that should trump the NLRA, rather 
than the reverse.”170 The Board seemed to imply that the lack of 
explanation indicated an improper presumption of the courts that the 
FAA held more importance than the NLRA. Such a presumption 
supports the argument that these decisions have dangerous implications 
for § 7 rights since the goal of the FAA, that of encouraging arbitration, 
may be given more weight in an accommodation than the goal of the 
NLRA to provide for collective employee rights. 
Furthermore, the issue in question, collective legal action, implicates 
the NLRA more than it does the FAA because “the NLRA includes 
express language protecting the rights of employees to engage in 
concerted action whereas the FAA contains no language in the FAA 
prohibiting collective litigation.”171 Thus, the Board indicated that the 
 
 163. Id.; Nat’l Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 364 (1940). 
 164. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. at *9. 
 165. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942). 
 166. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274, at *8 (Jan. 3, 2012).  
 167. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. at *12. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987) (finding that “no legislation pursues 
its purposes at all costs”). 
 170. Herrington v. Waterstone Mortg. Corp., 993 F. Supp. 2d 940, 946 (W.D. Wis. 2014). 
 171. Id. 
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policies of the NLRA should have received more weight in the 
accommodation of the two statutes because of its explicit policy to 
provide collective rights is directly affected. 
Additionally, the Board found that the Fifth Circuit gave too much 
weight to the FAA because invalidating arbitration agreements with 
class action waivers would not “frustrate” the primary purpose of the 
FAA to encourage arbitration.172 Employers still have incentive to pursue 
arbitration if class action waivers are invalidated. With arbitration, 
employers can avoid juries and the unpredictability of trial. Employers 
can also use “expert arbitrators less likely than juries to favor 
employees, . . . limited discovery, and . . . the ‘repeat player’ dynamics 
created by the reality that employers, but not so often employees, will 
return to the arbitral forum in future workplace disputes.”173 Thus, the 
invalidation of class action waivers would not significantly frustrate the 
purpose of the FAA to promote the use of arbitration because employers 
are likely to still favor arbitration over litigation. Additionally, as 
discussed in Part I, upholding class action waivers would severely 
frustrate the purpose of the NLRA. As a true accommodation weighs the 
impact of the issue on the competing goals of the conflicting statutes, the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision does not reflect a proper accommodation of the 
NLRA and the FAA since the impact on the FAA is minimal in 
comparison to the impact on the NLRA. 
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit’s application of the FAA to the 
NLRA should not be followed because it presents an opportunity for 
employers to challenge the Board’s interpretation of potential § 7 
employee collective activities that have yet to be established as a § 7 right 
through Supreme Court precedent. The Fifth Circuit’s decision found 
that the Board’s interpretation of class action as a § 7 activity conflicts 
with the FAA because it discourages the use of arbitration, and that any 
such discouragement dictates enforcement of arbitration agreements to 
its terms.174 Given that class action waivers severely frustrate the NLRA’s 
policies, the Fifth Circuit indicated that the goal of the FAA, to enforce 
arbitration agreements to its terms, prevails over the goal of the NLRA, 
to protect collective activity and prevent industrial strife. Thus, under the 
Fifth Circuit’s analysis, the Board’s interpretation of an employee 
collective activity will be given little or no weight in an accommodation 
of the two statutes when such an activity might discourage arbitration. 
Only the well-established § 7 rights, such as collective bargaining and 
union organizing, are presumably safe from this conflict, since 
substantive rights cannot be waived. But whenever there is an issue over 
 
 172. Rodriguez, 480 U.S. at 525–26. 
 173. Henry H. Drummonds, Avoiding the “Plague” of Class Action/Representative Action Wage 
and Hour Suits, 65 Labor L.J. 76, 76 (2014). 
 174. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 359–60 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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whether a collective activity is a § 7 right, the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning 
opens the door to further challenges to the authority of the Board in 
interpreting § 7 rights through the application of the FAA. 
Perhaps even more dangerous than the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning 
behind its holding that class action is not a § 7 right is the finding by some 
courts that even when pursuing a class action is a § 7 right, it can be 
waived in an arbitration agreement. Several courts have found that even 
when class action is considered a substantive right under § 7, class action 
waivers in arbitration agreements should still be upheld.175 These courts 
applied similar reasoning to the Fifth Circuit in concluding that the FAA 
prevails over the NLRA. The courts first found that there was a conflict 
between the FAA and the NLRA because compelling class actions 
conflicts with the FAA’s purpose to enforce arbitration agreements to 
the terms,176 and the courts also found that none of the FAA exceptions 
applied.177 Ultimately, these courts found that even if class action was a 
protected § 7 right, it can be waived in an arbitration agreement. 
The decisions of these courts have even more dangerous 
implications for § 7 rights than that of the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision in D.R. Horton. Under this line of case law, pursuing class 
actions is clearly a substantive § 7 right that can be waived when it is in 
an arbitration agreement, regardless of context, thus allowing employers 
to require waiver of this right in mandatory arbitration agreements. 
However, waiving § 7 rights goes against Supreme Court precedent, 
which establishes that substantive rights cannot be waived through 
agreement and undermines the NLRA. Furthermore, there is no 
precedent indicating that different § 7 rights should be analyzed under 
different standards. The implication that necessarily follows from the 
above cases, therefore, is that all § 7 rights can be waived in an 
arbitration agreement. Otherwise, a new and arbitrary category of § 7 
rights has been implicitly created—those rights that can be waived, as 
compared to those that cannot be waived. But, courts have never made 
 
 175. See Jasso v. Money Mart Express, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Morvant v. P.F. 
Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 831 (N.D. Cal. 2012); DeLock v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, 
Inc., 883 F. Supp. 2d 784 (E.D. Ark. 2012); Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
198 (Ct. App. 2012); Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 372 (Ct. App. 2012). 
 176. See DeLock, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 787; Jasso, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1048; Morvant, 870 F. Supp. 2d 
at 842 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Iskanian, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 380. 
 177. See DeLock, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 789 (The text of the NLRA “contains no command that is 
contrary to enforcing the FAA’s mandate”); Jasso, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1049; Morvant, 870 F. Supp. 2d 
at 845 (“Because Congress did not expressly provide that it was overriding any provision in the FAA 
when it enacted the NLRA ... the Court cannot read such a provision into [the NLRA].”); Nelsen, 144 
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 214 (“[T]here is no language in the NLRA ... demonstrating that Congress intended 
the employee concerted action rights therein to override the mandate of the FAA.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Iskanian, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 382 (“The D.R. Horton decision identified 
no ‘congressional command’ in the NLRA prohibiting enforcement of an arbitration agreement 
pursuant to its terms.”). 
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inquiries into the relative values of different § 7 rights, and such inquiries 
would add unnecessary complexity to the goal of the NLRA to ensure 
that employees have collective rights generally. If these arbitration 
agreements are upheld on the mere assertion that the FAA’s policy 
should be applied liberally, the NLRA would become a futility because 
employers will be incentivized to create arbitration agreements that 
waive collective rights, even those beyond class actions, and courts can 
continue to apply the FAA liberally in upholding these waivers. 
The reasoning of these courts strongly supports the FAA at the 
expense of the NLRA. Such prioritizing could potentially allow 
employers to restrict employee collective rights through the use of 
arbitration agreements. The reasoning of the Board represents a true 
accommodation of the two statutes because the accommodation has 
minimal impact on the goals of both statutes. 
III.  Recommendations 
Given the divergence between the courts and the Board on the 
enforceability of class action waivers in employment arbitration 
agreements, this Part explores two possible avenues that could bind the 
courts and the Board to the unenforceability of these waivers. First, if the 
Supreme Court were to issue a decision, the courts and the Board would 
be bound by such an interpretation. In order to best protect the rights of 
workers, the Supreme Court should follow the reasoning of the Board.178 
Alternatively, or in addition to, a Supreme Court precedent binding the 
Board and the courts, Congress could take action to ensure employers 
will not infringe the rights of low-wage workers. 
A. The Supreme Court Should Defer to the Board’s Interpretation 
of Class Actions as a Section 7 Activity. 
Should the Supreme Court decide the issue of the enforceability of 
class action waivers in employment arbitration agreements, the Court should 
defer to the Board’s interpretation of class action as a § 7 right. Such 
deference would be reasonable because of the Board’s expertise in 
implementing the NLRA and because such an interpretation avoids conflict 
with the FAA through the Supreme Court’s requirement that substantive 
rights cannot be waived through agreement. The Board’s latest decision 
in Murphy Oil regarding class action waivers in employment arbitration 
agreements reaffirmed its decision in D.R. Horton. In Murphy Oil, 
however, the Board addressed the arguments of the courts that have 
overturned D.R. Horton, primarily the Fifth Circuit’s, and analyzed the 
legal issue in the context of federal labor policy in general. The Board 
 
 178. See supra note 177. 
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found that class action waivers are always invalid in employment 
contracts.179 
Thus, the Supreme Court should follow the Murphy Oil Board in 
holding that pursuing class actions is a substantive right under the 
NLRA. Such a holding would preclude the narrowing of § 7 rights while 
avoiding conflict with the FAA because of the principle that substantive 
rights cannot be waived through agreement. In doing so, the Supreme 
Court should defer to the Board’s interpretation of class action as a 
substantive § 7 right. The Board has the “special function of applying the 
general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life.”180 
Like other administrative agencies, the Board is entitled to judicial 
deference when it interprets an ambiguous provision of a statute that it 
administers.181 A provision is ambiguous when Congress has not spoken 
on the precise issue.182 Because Congress delegated the issue of defining 
and accommodating § 7 rights to the Board, a court should not substitute 
its own judgment for a reasonable interpretation given by the Board.183 
As discussed in Part II.A, class actions fit well within the boundaries of 
established precedent defining § 7 rights. Furthermore, class actions 
clearly uphold the purpose of the NLRA. Thus, the pursuit of class 
actions as a substantive right under § 7 is a reasonable construction of the 
NLRA and courts should not substitute their own judgment over this 
issue. 
Deferring to this interpretation will not conflict with the FAA or 
undermine its purpose, and it will not blur the line between substantive 
and procedural rights. First, Board deference on this precise issue does 
not present the concerns some courts had over deferring to the Board’s 
interpretation of the conflict between the NLRA and the FAA.184 
Deferring to the Board only on the issue of class action as a substantive 
§ 7 right does not require any interpretation of the FAA and its policies, 
and thus, the deference is limited to that area in which the Board has 
expertise—the NLRA. Second, deferring to the Board on this issue and 
finding that pursuing a class action is a substantive right leads to the 
conclusion that there is no conflict with the FAA for the same reasons 
that the Board found no conflict: since pursuing a class action is a 
substantive right under the NLRA, Supreme Court precedent dictates 
that it cannot be waived through agreement. Because the intent of the 
 
 179. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 2014 WL 5465454, at *6–7 (Oct. 28, 2014). 
 180. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963). 
 181. See, e.g., NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987); cf. 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 182. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. at 842. 
 183. Id. at 844. 
 184. Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1054 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that no deference was 
owed to the Board because it has no expertise in interpreting the FAA); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young 
LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 297 n.8 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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FAA was to leave statutory rights alone, § 7 rights cannot be waived 
through arbitration agreements. Thus, there is no conflict between the 
NLRA and the FAA. Finally, pursuing class actions is the substantive 
right under the NLRA, not the right to class action certification: “Rule 
23 may be a procedural rule, but the § 7 right to act concertedly by 
invoking Rule 23, § 216(b), or other legal procedures is not.”185 The right 
to invoke class action procedures should not create any confusion 
between the procedural and substantive rights of workers. Ultimately, 
Supreme Court deference to the Board on the first issue of substantive 
rights under § 7 is consistent with deference principles and will avoid the 
problems discussed in Part II. 
B. Statutory Fix Could Ensure That Class Action Remains a 
Protected Employee Activity. 
Given the Supreme Court’s liberal policy toward the FAA, it is 
reasonable to predict that D.R. Horton and Murphy Oil will not survive 
and class action waivers will be upheld in employment arbitration 
agreements. In any case, Congress should consider a statutory fix to 
ensure that employees will be able to fully exercise their substantive 
rights under all employment statutes, thus preserving federal labor 
policy. This could involve either amending the FAA or the NLRA. 
The NLRA could be amended in a way that is consistent with the 
FAA. In order to avoid conflicting with the FAA and the Supreme 
Court’s liberal policy favoring arbitration, Congress could add an explicit 
command in the NLRA prohibiting class action waivers in employment 
contracts. Such a command would satisfy the second exception to the 
FAA’s general enforceability rule, a contrary congressional command. 
While the second exception to the FAA does not necessarily require an 
explicit command, the courts’ generally broad application of the FAA 
may lead to unfavorable interpretations of commands that are anything 
less than explicit. For example, the Fifth Circuit, in its decision to not 
follow D.R. Horton, found the language of the NLRA too general to 
constitute a clear contrary congressional command. The Fifth Circuit 
specifically pointed out that the NLRA does not mention “arbitration,” 
or “class action.”186 In order to ensure that courts will find a contrary 
congressional command, Congress should include in the NLRA an 
explicit provision designating class action as a protected concerted 
activity and a provision that states that all protected concerted activities 
cannot be waived in any arbitration agreement. 
 
 185. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274, at *10 (Jan. 3, 2012).) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 186. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 360 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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A potential problem with inserting such an explicit contrary 
congressional command in the NLRA is that it could incentivize those 
courts that strongly favor the FAA to find other collective activities 
outside of class action—such as social media posts aiming to encourage 
group action—as unprotected under § 7. Also, narrowing the provision to 
only discuss arbitration waivers of class actions would not account for 
changing circumstances. The workplace is constantly evolving and as new 
forms of collective activity arise, a narrow NLRA amendment would 
offer no protection from the scrutiny of the courts when arbitration 
agreements attempt to waive these activities. Under typical statutory 
construction tools, an enumeration of class actions could actually support 
a court’s conclusion that Congress did not intend a particular collective 
activity be a protected § 7 activity.  
Amending the FAA might avoid some of the problems discussed 
above. An amendment of the FAA should be narrowly tailored to 
prohibit class action waivers in the employment context when doing so 
would preclude an employee, as defined by the NLRA, from accessing 
the court or arbitral system to participate in a class action as defined by 
Rule 23. Such an amendment does not prohibit or necessarily discourage 
employers from using arbitration. All of the other advantages of 
arbitration are still largely intact, as discussed in Part II.B. The 
amendment would also be consistent with the current FAA statute 
because the FAA does not allow the waiver of substantive rights. In any 
case, the narrow scope of the amendment would do little to frustrate the 
purpose of the FAA, as class action waivers would not invalidate 
arbitration agreements in a wide variety of contexts. 
Conclusion 
Given employees’ minimal bargaining power in the employee-
employer relationship, many employment-related statutes necessarily 
protect low-wage workers from exploitation, from the FLSA, which 
guarantees overtime pay and a minimum wage, to the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act, which maintains health and safety standards in 
workplaces.187 The NLRA not only ensures that workers have access to 
collective means of ensuring these protections, but it is also meant to 
protect industries and the economy by diverting workers away from 
disruptive forms of collective activity. Without the ability to bring their 
claims as a class, many low-wage workers will be unprotected by the laws 
and employers will be incentivized to exploit them. These workers will be 
forced to seek redress through other means, including potentially 
disruptive actions. This could lead to widespread industrial strife, 
considering that many workplace violations, particularly wage theft, are 
 
 187. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1 (2016). 
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prevalent across industries. Thus, federal labor policy and the purpose of 
the NLRA dictate that pursuing class actions is a protected concerted 
activity, and the NLRA’s substantive rights should not yield to the FAA 
because federal labor policy would be severely frustrated by class action 
waivers. 
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